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Abstract
We analyze strategic rm behavior in settings where the production stage is
followed by several periods during which only sales take place. We analyze the
dynamics of the market structure, the development of prices and sales over time,
and the implications for prots and consumer surplus. Two specic settings
are analyzed. In the rst, a rm can commit up-front to a sales strategy that
does not depend on the actual sales of its competitor. In this case there is a
unique Nash equilibrium and price increases over time. In the second setting,
there is no commitment and rms can adjust their sales in response to observed
supply of their competitor in the previous period. It is shown that in this case
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium does not always exist. Equilibria can have
surprising features. For some parameter constellations, price may decrease over
time. It is also possible that the rm increases its prot by destroying some of its
production. When rms have equal size, the equilibrium outcome is the same in
both the commitment and the non-commitment setting. In general, the setting
without commitment is benecial to the larger rm, whereas the setting with
commitment leads to higher prots for the smaller rm.
Keywords: Dynamic Duopoly, Cournot Competition, Multi-period
Capacity Constraints, Commitment
JEL codes: D43, L13
1 Introduction
In most models of dynamic duopoly, it is assumed that production is instantly ad-
justed to per-period demand. However, in many real-world applications, this is not
the case. Take, for instance, an airplane company that is selling seats on a ight,
scheduled to take o¤ in a month from now. In the plane, the number of seats is xed,
and is not adjusted to the realized demand. Seats are sold at several moments in
time, until the month has elapsed. To maximize prots, the company has to take into
account how selling a seat today inuences the prots it can make on the remainder
of the seats. Moreover, it will have to take into account how its actions today will
a¤ect the behavior of its competitors for the rest of the month.
We are grateful to the conference participants at EARIE 2008 for helpful comments. P.J.J.
Herings would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientic Research (NWO) for nancial
support.
yDepartment of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maas-
tricht, the Netherlands
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This paper analyzes competition in situations where production precedes sales
and sales take place during a number of periods. As a result, the rm operates
under a multi-period capacity constraint. Any production process that involves batch
production would t this description. Other examples concern settings with costly
transportation, causing stores to be supplied only every few periods. Another relevant
case can be found in the eld of exhaustible resources. Firms at the source cannot
renew their supply, but have many periods to sell the resource.
We address a number of questions related to the dynamics of the market structure,
the development of prices and sales over time, and the implications for prots and
consumer surplus. We examine the simplest situation possible: production or resource
extraction has already taken place, the commodity is sold during two periods and
demand is linear. Firms thereby e¤ectively face a two-period capacity constraint.
In such a multi-period setting, it becomes relevant whether or not rms use current
period outcomes before deciding upon their next period actions. We refer to these two
possibilities as non-commitment versus commitment. Both the non-commitment and
the commitment case are analyzed and related to one another. In the commitment
setting, the strategy of a rm species the amount it is going to supply at each period.
This amount does not depend on the observed sales of the competing rm in the
previous periods. In the non-commitment setting, the strategy of a rm describes
how much stock to sell in each period, conditional on observed sales in previous
periods by the competing rm. We will show that the level of commitment can have
a serious inuence on the results.
In the commitment case, rms base their plan of action only on the level of initial
stock of both the rms. This case is the easiest one to analyze and in the exhaustible
resource literature, this has been done so for numerous settings similar to ours. This
literature starts with Hotelling (1931). More recently, Loury (1986), Gaudet and Van
Long (1994) and Schmalensee (1980), all nd results that, basically, coincide with the
results we nd for the commitment setting. We establish the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium. It is shown that, in this equilibrium, price increases over time
and as a consequence, aggregate sales decrease over time. Aggregate sales per period
depend on the distribution of initial production over the rms. Also, the rm with
more stock will never leave the market before the smaller one does.
In the setting without commitment, a rms supply is conditional on the amounts
sold in the previous period. This makes it possible to adjust the sales path over time
in response to observed sales by the competitor. Surprisingly, in the non-commitment
setting, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium does not always exist. However, if an
equilibrium exists, it is again unique. In equilibrium, the rm with the larger initial
production amount will never leave the market before the smaller rm. Equilibria
in the non-commitment setting may exhibit counterintuitive features. For instance,
price may decrease over time and therefore aggregate sales may increase over time.
In the exhaustible resource literature, Salo and Tahvonen (2001) also analyze a non-
commitment setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only article in this
area. Their model, however, di¤ers a lot from ours, which makes comparing results
pointless.
Apart from the literature on exhaustible resources, this paper is related to those
papers that analyze models with capacity constraints. Since Edgeworth (1925), it
has been widely known that per-period capacity constraints can greatly inuence
competition. Most of these papers, for instance Levitan and Shubik (1972) and
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Osborne and Pitchik (1986), use a static setting in which rms compete in price.
More recently, several papers were written in which rms compete in quantity and
are constrained in capacity. In Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), rms choose their
level of capacity before demand is known. After true consumersdemand is known,
they compete in quantity for one period. It is shown that a symmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Laye and Laye (2008) analyze multi-market Cournot
competition with capacity constraints. All rms can produce a limited amount of a
homogeneous product. For this product they have to choose which part they will sell
at every market. In this situation, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper in the literature that uses an
intertemporal capacity constraint, is Biglaiser and Vettas (2004). In their model, the
two competing rms have an equal nite amount of product that they can sell in two
periods. Demand is in units and growing, and rms compete in prices. The total
demand over the two periods is more than one rm can produce, but less than both
rms can produce together. An important feature of their model is that not only the
sellers, but also the buyers act strategically. One of the results is that, when there
is only one consumer, linear pricing implies there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Another paper that shows some resemblance with ours is the two-period model of
Saloner (1987). In that paper, there are two periods of production, after which the
goods are sold for the market clearing price.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section
3 analyzes the equilibria that result in the commitment case. The non-commitment
situation is addressed in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze how the equilibrium
outcomes in the commitment setting relate to the equilibrium outcomes in the non-
commitment setting. Section 6 concludes. Lengthy and technical proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider two prot maximizing rms that have produced (or bought) a homoge-
neous good. Firm i = 1; 2 therefore owns a nite amount Si  0 of the good. Since
the goods are produced beforehand, the production costs are sunk and they do not
play a role in the model. With their xed amount of stock as an upperbound, the
rms compete in quantity for two periods. A rm may choose to have residual supply
at the end of the second period. The quantities sold by rm i in period 1 and period
2 are denoted by qi and ri, respectively, so qi + ri  Si. The inverse demand each
period is
P (Q) = 1 Q;
where Q = q1+ q2 in the rst period and Q = r1+ r2 in the second.1 ;2 Prots earned
in period 2 are discounted with a factor  2 (0; 1].
Two cases are analyzed. In the rst, rms can commit to a sales strategy that is
independent of sales by their competitor. That is, after production has taken place,
1For convenience, we allow prices to be negative when the rms together supply more than one
unit to the market.
2The results in this paper can be extended to inverse demand functions of the form P (Q) = a bQ,
where a; b > 0, and with rms facing unit costs of c, to be interpreted for instance as handling costs.
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both rms unconditionally decide how much they are going to sell in each period. This
implies that rm is strategy space is of the form  i = f(qi; ri) 2 R2+ j qi + ri  Sig.
The second case is the one of non-commitment. In this case, the amount a rm
is going to o¤er for sale in a period depends on the realized sales of its competitor
in the previous period. As a result, the second-period strategy of a rm is now
the specication of a sales quantity conditional on the observation of rst-period
sales. We dene Fi = ffi : [0; S1]  [0; S2] ! [0; Si] j qi + fi(q1; q2)  Sig as the
set of functions that assign a feasible second-period sales quantity to every possible
combination of rst-period sales. Firm is strategy space is i = [0; Si] Fi:
3 Commitment
In the commitment case rms choose a sales path that does not depend on their
competitors realized sales. Given strategies (q1; r1) 2  1 and (q2; r2) 2  2; the prot
i(q1; r1; q2; r2) of rm i is given by
i(q1; r1; q2; r2) = qiP (qi + qj) + riP (ri + rj)
When choosing its sales path (qi; ri); rm i takes the sales path (qj ; rj) of rm j
as given, where we use the notation i and j for the two competing rms. Firm i
therefore solves the problem
max
qi;ri
i(q1; r1; q2; r2)
subject to
qi; ri  0 and qi + ri  Si:
The result is a best response i(qj ; rj) 2  i given by
i(qj ; rj) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(Si; 0)
8<:
if [qj   rj < 1     2Si;
qj + rj  2  2Si and qj ; rj  1]
or [qj  1  2Si and rj > 1]
(0; Si)
8<:
if [qj   rj > 1   + 2Si;
qj + rj  2  2Si and qj ; rj  1]
or [qj > 1 and rj  1  2Si]
1 +2Si qj+rj
2+2 ;
2Si 1++qj rj
2+2
 8<:
if 1     2Si  qj   rj 
1   + 2Si;
qj + rj  2  2Si and qj ; rj  1
(12   12qj ; 12   12rj)

if qj + rj > 2  2Si
and qj ; rj  1
(12   12qj ; 0)

if 1  2Si < qj  1
and rj > 1
(0; 12   12rj)

if 1  2Si < rj  1
and qj > 1
(0; 0) if qj ; rj > 1:
The seven cases for Si are mutually exclusive and the best responses against (qj ; rj)
are unique. The function i is continuous.
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A pair of strategies (q1; r1; q2; r2) is a Nash equilibrium if
1(q

1; r

1; q

2; r

2)  1(q1; r1; q2; r2) for all (q1; r1) 2  1;
2(q

1; r

1; q

2; r

2)  2(q1; r1; q2; r2) for all (q2; r2) 2  2;
or, equivalently, 1(q

2; r

2) = (q

1; r

1) and 2(q

1; r

1) = (q

2; r

2).
Given any initial combination (S1; S2; ), there is a unique equilibrium, as specied
in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1. In the gure,  is xed and S1; S2 are variable. A
change of  will not change the shape of the equilibrium areas, only the ratio between
them We use the superscript cto refer to equilibria in the commitment case. The
two letters in the subscript represent the relative level of stock of respectively rm
i and j , where l stands for low, m for medium and h for high. In Figure 1, also
the number of active rms in each period is indicated, where N1=N2=Nr represents
respectively the number of rms that have strictly positive sales in the rst period,
the number of rms that have strictly positive sales in the second period, and the
number of rms that have residual supply at the end of the second period. The gure
shows that the number of active rms increases when production increases.
Parameter conditions Period 1 Period 2
(Xcll) 0  S1 < 12   12S2   12 qc1 = S1 rc1 = 0
0  S2 < 12   12S1   12 qc2 = S2 rc2 = 0
(Xclm) 0  S1 < 13   13 qc1 = S1 rc1 = 0
1
2   12   12S1  S2  1  12S1 qc2 = 1 S1 +2S22+2 rc2 = 2S2+S1 1+2+2
(Xcml)
1
2   12   12S2  S1  1  12S2 qc1 = 1 +2S1 S22+2 rc1 = 2S1+S2 1+2+2
0  S2 < 13   13 qc2 = S2 rc2 = 0
(Xclh) 0  S1 < 13   13 qc1 = S1 rc1 = 0
1  12S1 < S2 qc2 = 12   12S1 rc2 = 12
(Xchl) 1  12S2 < S1 qc1 = 12   12S2 rc1 = 12
0  S2 < 13   13 qc2 = S2 rc2 = 0
(Xcmm)
1
3   13  S1  1  12S2 qc1 = 1 +3S13+3 rc1 = 3S1 1+3+3
1
3   13  S2  1  12S1 qc2 = 1 +3S23+3 rc2 = 3S2 1+3+3
(Xcmh)
1
3   13  S1  23 qc1 = 1 +3S13+3 rc1 = 3S1 1+3+3
1  12S1 < S2 qc2 = 2+4 3S16+6 rc2 = 4+2 3S16+6
(Xchm) 1  12S2 < S1 qc1 = 2+4 3S26+6 rc1 = 4+2 3S26+6
1
3   13 < S2  23 qc2 = 1 +3S23+3 rc2 = 3S2 1+3+3
(Xchh)
2
3 < S1 q
c
1 =
1
3 r
c
1 =
1
3
2
3 < S2 q
c
2 =
1
3 r
c
2 =
1
3
Table 1: Equilibria in the commitment case.
When the stock of rm 1 is low, as it is in Regions Xcll, X
c
lm ; and X
c
lh, it will sell
all of its stock in the rst period. These regions are non-empty only if the discount
rate is strictly below one. The discounting of second-period prots gives rms an
incentive to sell in period 1 rather than in period 2. When rm 1 has a low stock S1;
then selling this entirely in the rst period will hardly decrease the marginal revenue
in the rst period. Consequently, as long as  is not too high, marginal revenue in
the second period will be less than the marginal revenue in the rst period and rm
1 will sell its entire production in the rst period.
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Figure 1: The commitment case: Equilibrium outcome regions and the number of
rms that have stock in respectively period 1, period 2 and after period 2, for  = 0:5.
In Regions Xcml, X
c
mm ; and X
c
mh, rm 1 has an intermediate amount of the com-
modity in stock. It then maximizes prot by dividing its sales over the two periods
in such a way that marginal revenue in both periods is equal.
In the remaining Regions, Xchl, X
c
hm and X
c
hh, rm 1 has a high stock and acts as if
it has no capacity constraints. Firm 1 maximizes its prot in each period separately
as to maximize total prot. It will have residual stock at the end of period 2.
A similar line of argumentation applies to the equilibrium strategy of rm 2.
Note that in both periods in situation Xchh rms maximize their prot as if there
is no capacity limit. This results in both rms choosing their Cournot equilibrium
quantities of 13 in both periods.
The next ve propositions describe some comparative statics results for the case
with commitment.
Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium, price weakly increases over time.
Proof. For any given combination of S1; S2; and , one can verify directly that
qc1 + q
c
2  rc1 + rc2. Since the aggregate sales in the rst period weakly exceed the
aggregate sales in the second period, price in the rst period is less than or equal to
the price in the second period.
Notice, in particular, that as long as its capacity doesnt prevent it from doing so,
a rm will adjust its sales to achieve equal marginal revenues in both periods. This
together with a discount rate which is less than or equal to one implies that price
cannot decrease over time.
Also the following proposition describes an intuitive result.
Proposition 3.2 An increase in Si leads to a weak increase in rm is equilibrium
prot.
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Proof. The derivative of the equilibrium prot function of rm i with respect to
Si is non-negative in every equilibrium outcome region and the prot function is
continuous for all ; Si; Sj  0.
Notice, of course, that the prots in Proposition 3.2 correspond to sales revenues
and do not take into account the costs of production.
The next proposition studies how the relative stock sizes of the two rms a¤ect
the commodity price. For xed aggregate stock size S1 + S2, we analyze how an
increase in asymmetry jS1   S2j inuences equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 3.3 Given xed aggregate production S1 + S2; an increase in jS1   S2j
leads to a weak decrease of rst-period aggregate equilibrium sales and therefore a
weak increase of rst-period equilibrium price. It leads (i) to a decrease of second-
period aggregate equilibrium sales and an increase of second-period equilibrium price
in Regions Xcmh and X
c
hm and (ii) to an increase of second-period aggregate equilibrium
sales and a decrease of second-period equilibrium price in Regions Xclm and X
c
ml: It
has no e¤ect on second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and equilibrium price in the
other regions.
Proof. Let S = S1+S2 be xed and assume without loss of generality that S2  S1:
Then jS1   S2j increases if S1 decreases. Since S2  S1, it holds that (S1; S2; ) 2
Xcll [ Xclm [ Xclh [ Xcmm [ Xcmh [ Xchh. Let Qab be the aggregate sales in equilibrium
region Xab:
For rst-period aggregate sales, we nd that
Qcll = S;
@Qcll
@S1
= 0;
Qclm =
1 +S1+2S
2+2 ;
@Qclm
@S1
= 12+2 > 0;
Qclh =
1
2 +
1
2S1;
@Qclh
@S1
= 12 > 0;
Qcmm =
2 2+3S
3+3 ;
@Qcmm
@S1
= 0;
Qcmh =
4+2+3S1
6+6 ;
@Qcmh
@S1
= 36+6 > 0;
Qchh =
2
3 ;
@Qchh
@S1
= 0:
For second-period aggregate sales we have that
Qcll = 0;
@Qcll
@S1
= 0;
Qclm =
2S S1 1+
2+2 ;
@Qclm
@S1
=   12+2 < 0;
Qclh =
1
2 ;
@Qclh
@S1
= 0;
Qcmm =
3S 2+2
3+3 ;
@Qcmm
@S1
= 0;
Qcmh =
3S1+2+4
6+6 ;
@Qcmh
@S1
= 36+6 > 0;
Qchh =
2
3 ;
@Qchh
@S1
= 0:
A larger di¤erence in stocks results in a higher rst-period price. This is intuitive:
consider the extreme case where one of the rms is a monopolist, resulting in the
highest possible rst-period price. Surprisingly, the e¤ect of increasing di¤erence
between the rms stocks on second-period prices is ambiguous. In particular, it
leads to a weak decrease in second-period price in Regions Xclm and X
c
ml: In these
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regions, the smaller rm has no stock left at the beginning of period 2. An increase
in the size of the bigger rm then simply leads to more sales by this rm in period 2.
The following proposition studies the consequences of increased stocks for con-
sumer surplus. Consumer surplus in the rst period and in the second period is
respectively 12(q1 + q2)
2 and 12(r1 + r2)
2. To compute the total consumer surplus
we have to discount the second-period consumer surplus by : Consumer surplus is
therefore given by 12(q1 + q2)
2 + 12(r1 + r2)
2:
Proposition 3.4 Equilibrium consumer surplus weakly increases if the stock of at
least one of the rms increases.
Proof. It follows directly from the equilibrium outcomes that per-period sales weakly
increase in S1 and S2:
Since the e¤ect of an increase in jS1 S2j on second-period sales is ambiguous by
Proposition 3.3, it is not a priori clear how such an increase a¤ects consumer surplus.
The next proposition states, nevertheless, that this e¤ect is unambiguously negative.
Proposition 3.5 Given xed aggregate stock S1 + S2; an increase in jS1   S2j leads
to a weak decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof. Proposition 3.3 implies a weak decrease in sales in both periods when jS1 S2j
increases, and therefore a weak decrease in consumer surplus, except possibly in
Regions Xclm and X
c
ml:
Consider some (S1; S2; ) in Region Xclm or X
c
ml: Assume without loss of generality
that S2  S1; so jS1   S2j increases if S1 decreases. Then (S1; S2; ) belongs to
Region Xclm : Consumer surplus is given by
1
2

1   + S1 + 2S
2 + 2
2
  1
2


2S   S1   1 + 
2 + 2
2
;
where, as before, S = S1 + S2. The derivative of the expression above with respect
to S1 is given by
1   + S1 + 2S
(2 + 2)2
+ 
2S   S1   1 + 
(2 + 2)2
;
which is easily shown to be non-negative.
By the same type of analysis, it can be shown that the results we have found
for equilibrium consumer surplus coincide with the results that can be found for
equilibrium total surplus. Total surplus is dened as the addition of consumer surplus
and both the rmssurplus. In this case, total surplus is
(q1 + q2)(1  1
2
(q1 + q2)) + (r1 + r2)(1  1
2
(r1 + r2)):
Equilibrium total surplus weakly increases if production by at least one of the rms
increases and, given xed aggregate production S1+S2; an increase in jS1 S2j leads
to a weak decrease in equilibrium total surplus.
Summary of comparative statics results for the commitment case
We nd that, when rms have the power to commit to an unconditional sales strategy,
price never decreases over time. A rms prot increases when its stock increases and
so does consumer surplus and total surplus. Finally, an increase in the di¤erence
between the stocks of the rms leads to lower sales in period 1 and lower consumer
surplus and total surplus. The e¤ect on period 2 sales is ambiguous.
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Ti Tj ri rj prots i prots j
(Yhh) > 13 >
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
9
1
9
(Ylh)  13 > 1 Ti2 Ti 1 Ti2 Ti(1 Ti2 ) (1 Ti2 )2
(Yhl) >
1 Tj
2  13
1 Tj
2 Tj
(1 Tj)2
4 Tj(
1 Tj
2 )
(Yll)  1 Tj2  1 Ti2 Ti Tj Ti(1  Ti   Tj) Tj(1  Ti   Tj)
Table 2: Second-period equilibrium outcomes.
4 Non-commitment
We now study the case where the sales strategy of a rm in period 2 depends on the
observed rst-period sales. Once rms arrive in the second period of the game, they
play a one-period game with capacity constraints. We analyze the subgame perfect
Nash equilibria of the game. We do this by rst analyzing the Nash equilibria of all
possible period 2 subgames.
Consider the subgame q = (q1; q2) in period 2 that results from rst-period sales
(q1; q2) by the rms. Denote rm is second-period stock by Ti = Si qi. Now we can
dene iq : [0; Tj ] ! [0; Ti] as rm is best response function in subgame q. Given
sales rj by rm j; rm i solves the problem
max
ri
riP (ri + rj)
subject to
0  ri  Ti:
The best response for rm i in period 2 is then given by
iq(rj) =

Ti; if 0  Ti  12   12rj ;
maxf0; 12   12rjg; otherwise.
Quantities (r1; r2) are a Nash equilibrium of the second-period subgame q if and
only if 1q(r2) = r1 and 2q(r1) = r2. Each subgame q has a unique Nash equilibrium
as specied in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 2.
In Region Yhh, both rms have su¢ cient residual stock in the second period to
choose their unconstrained prot maximizing sales quantity. In Regions Yhl and Ylh,
only one rm is restricted by its residual stock, respectively rm 1 and rm 2. In
Region Yll both rms are restricted by their residual stock and sell in the second
period all they have left.
The equilibrium action chosen by rm i in period 2 is given by the function fi
dened by
fi (qi; qj) =
8><>:
1
3 ; if Ti; Tj >
1
3 ;
1
2   12Tj ; if Ti > 12   12Tj and Tj  13 ;
Ti; if Ti  13 or Tj  1  2Ti:
(1)
We now replace the second-period subgames by the second-period outcomes as
induced by f: The result is a one-period reduced game with payo¤s given by
Ri (qi; qj) = i(qi; qj ; f

i (qi; qj); f

j (qi; qj)); 0  qi  Si; 0  qj  Sj :
9
Figure 2: Second-period equilibrium regions for  = 0:5.
It follows that the reduced prot function of rm i is given by
Ri (qi; qj) = qi(1  qi   qj) + (2)8>><>>:
1
9; if Ti >
1
3 and Tj >
1
3 ; (Yhh)
1
2Ti(1  Ti); if 1  2Tj < Ti  13 ; (Ylh)
1
4(1  Tj)2; if Ti > 12   12Tj and Tj  13 ; (Yhl)
Ti(1  Ti   Tj); if Ti  minf12   12Tj ; 1  2Tjg: (Yll)
A pair of strategies (q1; q2) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if it holds that
R1 (q

1; q

2)  R1 (q1; q2); for all q1 2 [0; S1];
R1 (q

1; q

2)  R1 (q1; q2); for all q2 2 [0; S2]:
A Nash equilibrium (q1; q2) of the reduced game corresponds to a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (q1; f1 ; q2; f2 ) of the complete game and vice versa.
Lemma 4.1 qi ; q

j  12 for any Nash equilibrium (q1; q2) of the reduced game.
Proof. The rst-period prot is qi(1   qi   qj); which is strictly decreasing in qi if
qi >
1
2   12qj ; so in particular if qi > 12 : If rm i decreases its rst-period sales, it
increases its second-period stock. As can be seen in Table 2, rm is second-period
prot never decreases when its second-period stock increases. Consequently, rm i
strictly increases its prots if it sets qi = 12 instead of qi >
1
2 .
Using the reduced prot function (2), we determine the reduced best responses,
denoting by Ri (qj) the reduced best response of rm i against qj . Appendix A
provides the computational details. Given qj ; the reduced prot function is not
always concave, though it is continuous. As a consequence, the reduced best response
against qj does always exist, but may not be unique. We therefore have a reduced
best response correspondence rather than a reduced best response function. This
correspondence may fail to be convex-valued though it is upper hemi-continuous.
The reduced best response correspondence of rm i is presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: The non-commitment case: Equilibrium outcome regions and the number
of rms that have stock in respectively period 1, period 2 and after period 2, for
 = 0:5.
Quantities (q1; q2) are a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if and only if qi 2
Ri (q

j ) and q

j 2 Rj (qi ): The Nash equilibria of the reduced game, and thereby the
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game of interest, are calculated in Appendix B.
Since the reduced best response correspondences are not convex-valued, it is not
guaranteed that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Indeed, it turns out that
for some combinations of Si; Sj and  a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium fails to
exist.
The set of exogenous variables (S1; S2; ) can be partitioned in 11 regions. In
each region, the equilibria share the same qualitative features and are di¤erentiable
functions of S1; S2; and . The equilibrium regions are given in Table 3 and depicted
in Figure 3 for  = 0:5: Table 3 also shows the equilibrium outcomes. We use the
superscript ncto refer to equilibria in the non-commitment case. The two letters in
the subscript represent the relative level of stock of respectively rm i and j , where
l stands for low, m for medium, mfor medium-high and h for high.
As is illustrated by Figure 3 for  = 1=2; the 11 regions are mutually exclusive.
This property is generally true, leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 There is at most one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for every com-
bination of S1; S2; and .
Proof. It follows from comparing the constraints in Table 3, that all regions are
disjoint. Therefore, every combination of Si; Sj and  belongs to at most one equi-
librium region. The Nash equilibrium of the reduced game is therefore unique for
(Si; Sj ; ) in Regions Xncll up to and including X
nc
hh: The reduced game has no Nash
equilibrium for (Si; Sj ; ) belonging to Region XncØ : Nash equilibria for the reduced
11
Parameter conditions Period 1 Period 2
(Xncll ) 0  S1 < 12   12   12S2 qnc1 = S1 rnc1 = 0
0  S2 < 12   12   12S1 qnc2 = S2 rnc2 = 0
(Xnclm) 0  S1 < 13(1  ) qnc1 = S1 rnc1 = 0
1
2   12   12S1  S2  1  12S1 qnc2 = 1 S1+2S2 2+2 rnc2 = 2S2 1+S1+2+2
(Xncml)
1
2   12   12S2  S1  1  12S2 qnc1 = 1 S2+2S1 2+2 rnc2 = 2S1 1+S2+2+2
0  S2 < 13(1  ) qnc2 = S2 rnc2 = 0
(Xnclh ) 0  S1 < 13(1  ) qnc1 = S1 rnc1 = 0
S2 > 1  12S1 qnc2 = 12   12S1 rnc2 = 12
(Xnchl ) S1 > 1  12S2 qnc1 = 12   12S2 rnc1 = 12
0  S2 < 13(1  ) qnc2 = S2 rnc2 = 0
(Xncmma)
1
3(1  )  S1  1
1
3(1  )  S2  2 qnc1 = 1 +3S13+3 rnc1 = 3S1 1+3+3
(Xncmmb) 3 < S1  1  12S2 qnc2 = 1 +3S23+3 rnc2 = 3S2 1+3+3
4 < S2  1  12S1
(Xncmh)
1
3(1  )  S1  23   19 qnc1 = 1 +2S13+2 rnc1 = 3S1 1+3+2
S2 > 5 q
nc
2 =
2+3 2S1
6+4 r
nc
2 =
4+ 3S1
6+4
(Xnchm) S1 > 6 q
nc
1 =
2+3 2S2
6+4 r
nc
1 =
4+ 3S2
6+4
1
3(1  )  S2  23   19 qnc2 = 1 +2S23+2 rnc2 = 3S2 1+3+2
(Xncmh)
2
3   19 < S1  23 qnc1 = S1   13 rnc1 = 13
S2 > 7 q
nc
2 =
2
3   12S1 rnc2 = 13
(Xnchm) S1 > 8 q
nc
1 =
2
3   12S2 rnc1 = 13
2
3   19 < S2  23 qnc2 = S2   13 rnc2 = 13
(Xnchh) S1 >
2
3 q
nc
1 =
1
3 r
nc
1 =
1
3
S2 >
2
3 q
nc
2 =
1
3 r
nc
2 =
1
3
(XncØ ) All other values of (S1; S2; ) No equilibrium
Explanation of the symbols
1
7
6   S2   16 +
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1+ (
5
6 +
1
6   S2)
2
7
6   S1   16 +
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1+ (
5
6 +
1
6   S1)
3
4+5 1
2
  1
2
2 3S2
6+6
4
4+5 1
2
  1
2
2 3S1
6+6
5
7+6 1
2
+ 3
2
2 6S1 5S1 2S1+(5+5 2S1)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
6+7+22+(6+4)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
6
7+6 1
2
+ 3
2
2 6S2 5S2 2S2+(5+5 2S2)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
6+7+22+(6+4)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
7
10+6 7S1 3S1
8+6
8
10+6 7S2 3S2
8+6
Table 3: Equilibria in the non-commitment case.
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game are in a one to one relationship with subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
complete game.
In some cases an equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 4.3 For every , there is a set of stock levels (S1; S2) with non-empty
interior for which an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. It can be veried that for each ; the set of stock proles (S1; S2) such that
(S1; S2; ) belongs to Region XncØ has a non-empty interior.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the dynamic development of the market structure,
where again N1=N2=Nr represents the number of rms that sell the commodity in
the rst period, the number of rms that sell the commodity in the second period,
and the number of rms that have residual stock by the end of the second period.
Just as in the non-commitment case, the number of active rms increases when initial
production levels increase.
Some of the regions in the non-commitment case coincide with those in the case
with commitment. This holds specically for the Regions Xncll , X
nc
lm , X
nc
ml, X
nc
lh , X
nc
hl ,
Xncmm ; and X
nc
hh.
3 For these regions, the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment and
in the non-commitment case are equivalent.
In the commitment case, the price never decreases from period 1 to period 2. The
reason is that a decreasing price would make it protable for a rm to transfer some
of its sales from period 2 to period 1. This line of reasoning does not hold when
there is no commitment. Indeed, in the non-commitment case a transfer of sales from
period 2 to period 1 may trigger a reaction by the competing rm, which renders such
a transfer unprotable, even when the price in period 1 is higher than in period 2.
Proposition 4.4 In Regions Xncll ;X
nc
lm ;X
nc
ml;X
nc
lh ;X
nc
hl ;X
nc
mm and X
nc
hh; the equilibrium
price weakly increases over time. For any , there is a set of stock levels (S1; S2) 2
Xncmh [ Xncmh [ Xnchm [ Xnchm with non-empty interior such that the equilibrium price
strictly decreases over time. In particular, the equilibrium price strictly decreases
over time if and only if Si < Sj and
2  2
3  2  Si <
2
3
  1
9
;
Sj >
7 + 612 +
3
2
2   6Si   5Si   2Si + (5 + 5   2Si)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
6 + 7 + 22 + (6 + 4)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
or
2
3
  1
9
 < Si <
2
3
;
Sj >
10 + 6   7Si   3Si
8 + 6
:
3We have named the regions in the non-commitment case in such a way that the names in the
commitment and non-commitment case coincide as much as possible.
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Proof. By Proposition 3.1, price never decreases over time in the commitment
situation. Price decreases in the non-commitment case are therefore only possible in
regions where the non-commitment case is di¤erent from the case with commitment,
i.e. Regions Xncmh; X
nc
hm ; X
nc
mh; and X
nc
hm: In these regions, one rm has an intermediate
and one rm has a high stock level. Let i be the intermediate rm and let j be the
large rm. In Regions Xncmh and X
nc
hm it holds that
1
3
(1  ) < Si  2
3
  1
9
;
Sj >
7 + 612 +
3
2
2   6Si   5Si   2Si + (5 + 5   2Si)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
6 + 7 + 22 + (6 + 4)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
:
The total quantity sold in the rst period is
qnci + q
nc
j =
1   + 2Si
3 + 2
+
2 + 3   2Si
6 + 4
=
4 +  + 2Si
6 + 4
:
The total quantity sold in the second period is
rnci + r
nc
j =
3Si   1 + 
3 + 2
+
4 +    3Si
6 + 4
=
3Si + 2 + 3
6 + 4
:
The price strictly decreases from period 1 to period 2 when 4++2Si < 3Si+2+3;
so when Si > 2 23 2 .
In Regions Xncmh and X
nc
hmwe have
2
3
  1
9
 < Si  2
3
Sj >
10 + 6   7Si   3Si
8 + 6
:
The total quantity sold in the rst period is
qnci + q
nc
j = Si  
1
3
+
2
3
  1
2
Si =
1
2
Si +
1
3
:
The total quantity sold in the second period is
rnci + r
nc
j =
1
3
+
1
3
=
2
3
:
Since 12Si +
1
3 <
2
3 as long as Si <
2
3 , in this region, price strictly decreases from
period one to period two whenever Si 6= 23 :
Proposition 4.4 makes clear that price may decrease over time in the non-commit-
ment case. This can happen for the following reason. In the settings where price
decreases over time, the larger rm reacts in both periods unrestricted by its stock
per-period optimal to the sales of the smaller rm. Since the smaller rm has a
stock less than 1=3 in the second period, the larger rm cannot deviate in the rst
period in such a way that the smaller rm will lower its second-period sales. This
implies that the larger rm cannot increase prots by deviating. The smaller rm,
just as in the commitment case, might want to transfer some of its sales from the
second to the rst period. However, in the non-commitment situation, if the smaller
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rm transfers sales from period 2 to period 1, there will be a response by the larger
rm. The larger rm reacts to this transfer by increasing its second-period sales,
causing the second-period price to fall. Therefore, the second-period prots of the
smaller rm drop. The decrease in prots in the second period outweigh the increase
in prots in the rst period. This makes transferring sales from the second-period to
the rst not worth the while for the smaller rm.
In the commitment case, an increase in a rms stock leads to an increase in prots.
Is this property still true in the non-commitment case? It is easily shown, with the
help of the derivatives of the equilibrium prots, that within each region prot rises
when a rms stock level increases. Moreover, the prot function is continuous on
the domain of (Si; Sj ; ) for which an equilibrium exists. However, it is still possible
for the prot to decrease when a rms stock level increases, namely when a small
increase in stock level leads to non-existence of equilibrium. The next proposition
conrms that such decreases in prot may occur for specic parameter values. That
is, equilibria may not be destroy-proof.
Proposition 4.5 An increase in Si, ceterus paribus, leads to a weak increase of the
equilibrium prot of rm i, as long as the increase doesnt change the equilibrium
outcome region. If an increase in Si does change the equilibrium outcome region,
there are combinations of Si; Sj and  such that an increase in Si leads to a strict
decrease in equilibrium prot of rm i.
Proof. The derivative of the equilibrium prot function with respect to Si is non-
negative in every equilibrium region. The non-existence of an equilibrium for some
combinations of (Si; Sj ; ) makes it possible that a strict increase in Si leads to a
strict decrease in the equilibrium prot of rm i. Take  = 0:2; Sj = 0:69824; and
Si =
7
6
  Sj   1
6
 +
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
1 + 
(
5
6
+
1
6
   Sj)  0:59634:
These parameters correspond to a point on the upper boundary of Region Xncmm . The
equilibrium prot for rm i equals 0:12937: We now let Si increase to
S0i =
7 + 612 +
3
2
2   6Sj   78Sj   22Sj + (5 + 5   6Sj   4Sj)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
6 + 5 + 2 + 2
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
 0:61011:
Our parameters now belong to Region Xncmh. The equilibrium prot for rm i equals
0:12751:
We now study the consequences of increasing di¤erence in stock size on sales.
Proposition 4.6 Given xed aggregate stock S1+S2; an increase in jS1 S2j leads to
a weak decrease in rst-period aggregate equilibrium sales and a weak increase of rst-
period equilibrium price. It leads to a decrease in second-period aggregate equilibrium
sales and an increase in second-period equilibrium price in Regions Xcmh and X
c
hm and
to an increase in second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and a decrease in second-
period equilibrium price in Regions Xclm and X
c
ml: It has no e¤ect on second-period
aggregate equilibrium sales and equilibrium price in the other regions.
15
Proof. Let S = S1+S2 be xed and assume without loss of generality that S2  S1:
Then jS1   S2j increases if S1 decreases. Since S2  S1; it holds that (S1; S2; ) 2
Xncll [Xnclm [Xnclh [Xncmm [Xncmh [Xncmh [Xnchh. It holds that
Qncll = S;
@Qncll
@S1
= 0;
Qnclm =
1 +S1+2S
2+2 ;
@Qnclm
@S1
= 12+2 > 0;
Qnclh =
1
2 +
1
2S1;
@Qnclh
@S1
= 12 > 0;
Qncmm =
2 2+3S
3+3 ;
@Qncmm
@S1
= 0;
Qncmh =
4++2S1
6+4 ;
@Qncmh
@S1
= 26+4 > 0;
Qncmh =
1
2S1 +
1
3 ;
@Qncm h
@S1
= 12 > 0:
Qnchh =
2
3 ;
@Qnchh
@S1
= 0;
Between Regions Xncmm and X
nc
mh there is no equilibrium. Consider an increase in S1
together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S2 that leads to a move from
Region Xncmh to Region X
nc
mm : It holds that Q
nc
mm coincides with Q
c
mm and
Qncmh =
4 +  + 2S1
6 + 4
<
4 + 2 + 3S1
6 + 6
= Qcmh:
The desired result for this case now follows from Proposition 3.3.
Between Regions Xncmh and X
nc
mm there is no equilibrium. Consider an increase
in S1 together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S2 that leads to a move
from Region Xncmh to Region X
nc
mm : Again, it holds that Q
nc
mm coincides with Q
c
mm ;
Region Xncmh is a subset of Region X
c
mh; and
Qncmh =
1
2
S1 +
1
3
 4 + 2 + 3S1
6 + 6
= Qcmh;
where S1  2=3 is used to derive the inequality sign. The desired result for this case
now follows from Proposition 3.3.
For second-period aggregate sales we have that
Qncll = 0;
@Qncll
@S1
= 0;
Qnclm =
2S S1 1+
2+2 ;
@Qnclm
@S1
=   12+2 < 0;
Qnclh =
1
2 ;
@Qnclh
@S1
= 0;
Qncmm =
3S 2+2
3+3 ;
@Qncmm
@S1
= 0;
Qncmh =
3S1+2+3
6+4 ;
@Qncmh
@S1
= 36+4 > 0;
Qncmh =
2
3 ;
@Qncm h
@S1
= 0;
Qnchh =
2
3 ;
@Qnchh
@S1
= 0:
Between Regions Xncmm and X
nc
mh there is no equilibrium. For this region, the
consequences of increasing disparity of initial stock on second-period aggregate sales
havent been discussed yet. Consider an increase in S1 together with a decrease of
the same magnitude in S2 that leads to a move from Region Xncmh to Region X
nc
mm :
The second-period equilibrium sales may both decrease and increase, depending on
the values of S1; S2; and : For instance, when S1 = 5=9; S2 = 3=4; and  = 1; we
are in Region Xncmh and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 2=3: After an
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increase in S1 accompanied by a decrease in S2 of the same magnitude resulting in
S1 = S2 = 47=72; we are in Region Xncmm and the aggregate second-period sales are
equal to 47=72 < 2=3: We now make the same calculations for a discount rate equal
to 1=2: When (S1; S2; ) = (5=9; 3=4; 1=2) we are in Region Xncmh and the aggregate
second-period sales are equal to 13=24; whereas at (S1; S2; ) = (47=72; 47=72; 1=2) we
are in Region Xncmm and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 35=54 > 13=24:
There is also no equilibrium between Regions Xncmm and X
nc
mh: An increase in
S1 together with a decrease of the same size in S2 that leads from Region Xncmh to
Region Xncmm will univocally lead to a decrease in second-period sales. Indeed, since
in Region Xncmm we have S1 + S2  4=3; we have that
Qncmm =
3S   2 + 2
3 + 3
 2
3
= Qncmh:
Analogous results hold for comparative statics involving Regions Xncmm and X
nc
hm ; and
Regions Xncmm and X
nc
hm:
We next evaluate the e¤ect of an increase in stock on consumer surplus. We use
the same measure for consumer surplus as before.
Proposition 4.7 An increase in Si, ceterus paribus, leads to a weak increase in
equilibrium consumer surplus, as long as the increase doesnt change the equilibrium
outcome region. For some combinations of Si; Sj and , a strict increase in Si does
change the equilibrium outcome region. This can lead to a strict decrease in equilib-
rium consumer surplus.
Proof. It follows directly from the equilibrium outcomes that per-period sales in
every equilibrium outcome region weakly increase in S1 and S2. However, take ; Si; S0i
and Sj as dened in the proof of Proposition 4.5. Equilibrium consumer surplus for
; Si; Sj is
CSncmm  0:25818:
An increase from Si to S0i results in equilibrium consumer surplus of
CSncmh  0:25600:
That is, just like the rms, consumers usually gain from an increase in stock.
There are settings in which consumers are better o¤ if a rm does not increase its
stock. However, this can only happen if, for some stock levels in between the old and
new stock level of the rm, ceterus paribus, an equilibrium doesnt exist.
The inuence of increasing di¤erence in stock level on consumer surplus is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8 Given xed aggregate stock S1 + S2, an increase in jS1   S2j leads
to a weak decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof. By Proposition 3.5, this proposition holds for jS1 S2j; as long as (S1; S2; ) =2
Xncmh[Xnchm[Xncmh[Xnchm. Assume, without loss of generality, that S2  S1, so jS1 S2j
increases if S1 decreases. Proposition 4.6 implies a weak decrease in sales in both
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periods when jS1 S2j increases, and therefore a weak decrease in consumer surplus,
for Region Xncmh and X
nc
mh. The remaining cases to check are those where a decrease
in S1 changes the equilibrium outcome from a point in Xncmm to a point in X
nc
mh or
from Xncmm to X
nc
mh.
Let c = S1 + S2, where c is a constant. Consumer surplus in Region Xncmh and
Region Xncmh is
CSncmh =
1
2
(
4 +  + 2S1
6 + 4
)2 +
1
2
(
3S1 + 2 + 3
6 + 4
)2;
CSncmh =
1
2
(
1
2
S1 +
1
3
)2 +
2
9
;
and in Region Xncmm
CSncmm =
1
2
(
2  2 + 3c
3 + 3
)2 +
1
2
(
3c  2 + 2
3 + 3
)2:
As mentioned, consumer surplus in Regions Xncmh and X
nc
mh increases with S1,
for xed c. In Region CSncmm , consumer surplus doesnt change if S1 changes, for
xed c. This implies that, if CSncmh  CSncmm for any (S1; S2; ) 2 f(S1; S2; ) j
S2 = 5;
1
3(1   )  S1  23   19g, consumer surplus decreases when an increase in
S1 changes the equilibrium outcome from period Xncmh to X
nc
mm : Calculations indeed
show that CSncmh  CSncmm for these values of (S1; S2; ). It also implies that, if
CSncmh  CSncmm for any (S1; S2; ) 2 f(S1; S2; ) j S2 = 7; 23   19 < S1  23g,
consumer surplus decreases when an increase in S1changes the equilibrium outcome
from period Xncmh to X
nc
mm :
The last part of this section is, again, devoted to total surplus. We have already
seen that an increase in a rms stock can lead to a decrease in its equilibrium
prot and in consumer surplus. It will not come as a surprise that, with some extra
calculations, the same type of results can be found for total surplus. If an increase in
stock of one of the rms doesnt change the equilibrium outcome region, equilibrium
total surplus increases with this increase in stock. If an increase in stock of one of the
rms does change the equilibrium outcome region, for some combinations of variables,
this leads to a decrease in total surplus. And, given xed aggregate stock S1 + S2;
an increase in jS1   S2j leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium total surplus.
Summary of comparative statics results for the non-commitment case
In this section we have found that there is at most one subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium for each combination of Si; Sj and . In contrast to the commitment situation,
in the case without commitment it is possible that the equilibrium price decreases
over time and that a rms prot increases when it produces less. Increasing dis-
parity in rm size leads to higher rst-period equilibrium prices and lower sales, but
has ambiguous e¤ects on second-period equilibrium prices. Within every equilibrium
outcome region, an increase in some rms production level leads to an increase in
its prot, an increase in consumer surplus and an increase in total surplus. However,
there are situations in which an increase in some rms production level can lead to
a decrease in its prots, a decrease in consumer surplus and/or a decrease in total
surplus.
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5 Commitment versus Non-commitment
In this section, we analyze how the equilibrium outcomes of the commitment setting
are related to the equilibrium outcomes of the non-commitment case.
For certain regions, as was mentioned before, the equilibrium outcomes coincide.
Notice that the equilibrium outcome corresponds to equilibrium sales by the two
rms in both periods.
Proposition 5.1 For every (S1; S2; ) 2 Xncll [Xnclm[Xncml[Xnclh [Xnchl [Xncmm[Xnchh; the
equilibrium sales in the non-commitment case coincide with those of the commitment
setting.
Proof. From the constraints dening the various regions it follows that Xncll  Xcll;
Xnclm  Xclm ; Xncml  Xcml; Xnclh  Xclh; Xnchl  Xchl;Xncmm  Xcmm ; and Xnchh  Xchh: The
equilibrium sales in Regions Xncll ; X
nc
lm ; X
nc
ml; X
nc
lh ; X
nc
hl ; X
nc
mm ; and X
nc
hh coincide with
the equilibrium sales in Region Xcll; X
c
lm ; X
c
ml; X
c
lh; X
c
hl; X
c
mm ; and X
c
hh; respectively.
An equilibrium always exists when S1 = S2. Since, for these production levels,
(S1; S1; ) 2 Xncll [ Xncmm[Xnchh when there is no commitment and (S1; S1; ) 2 Xcll [
Xcmm [Xchh when there is commitment, the following corollary follows.
Corollary 5.2 When rms 1 and 2 are symmetric, the equilibrium sales in the com-
mitment case coincide with those of the non-commitment setting.
The equivalence in equilibrium outcomes no longer holds when (Si; Sj ; ) 2 Xncmh[
Xnchm [ Xncmh [ Xnchm[ XncØ : In these cases, there is one rm of intermediate size, and
one rm that can react almost unrestrictedly to the quantities of its competitor. In
the following we refer to these rms as the intermediate rm and the large rm,
respectively. We show that the large rm gains and the intermediate rm loses from
being in the non-commitment case, whenever we are not in Region XncØ ; i.e. whenever
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in the non-commitment case.
Proposition 5.3 For every (S1; S2;) outside Region XncØ ; the change in equilibrium
outcome from the commitment case to the non-commitment case is to the advantage
of the larger rm and to the disadvantage of the smaller rm.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that S2  S1: Whenever there is a change
in the equilibrium outcome, it holds that (S1; S2; ) belongs to Region Xcmh: Firm 2
has prots equal to
c2 = (
2 + 4   3S1
6 + 6
)2 + (
4 + 2   3S1
6 + 6
)2:
It also holds that (S1; S2; ) belongs to Region Xncmh or Region X
nc
mh. In Region X
nc
mh;
rm 2 has prots equal to
nc2 = (
2 + 3   2S1
6 + 4
)2 + (
4 +    3S1
6 + 4
)2:
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In Region Xncmh the prots of rm 2 are equal to
nc2 =
4
9
+
1
9
   2
3
S1 +
1
4
(S1)
2:
We have that S1  23 in all these regions, from which it follows that nc2  c2:
Analogous calculations show the opposite relation for the prots of rm 1.
The intuition for this proposition follows from the same line of reasoning as that
of Proposition 4.4. The total quantity sold is, in both the settings, the same for
each rm. The small rm sells all of its stock in two periods, whereas the large rm
reacts per-period optimal. The small rm sells more of its stock in the rst period
commitment setting than in the rst period non-commitment setting and for the large
rm it is the other way around. Price is higher in the rst period non-commitment
setting than in the rst period commitment setting (see Proposition 5.4). For the
second period, it is the other way around again. Therefore, the large rm makes more
prot and the small rm makes less prot in the non-commitment setting, compared
to the commitment setting. The small rm cannot change this by selling more of
its stock in the rst period, since this will induce the large rm to sell extra in the
second period, thereby making this deviation unprotable.
The following proposition describes the consequences of commitment for equilib-
rium prices and sales.
Proposition 5.4 For every (S1; S2;) outside Region XncØ ; the rst-period equilib-
rium price in the non-commitment case is greater than or equal to the rst-period
equilibrium price in the commitment case and the second-period equilibrium price in
the non-commitment case is less than or equal to the second-period equilibrium price
in the commitment setting. The opposite relationships hold for aggregate sales in the
two periods.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that S2  S1. Whenever there is a
change in the equilibrium price, (S1; S2; ) belongs to Region Xcmh: In Region X
c
mh,
prices in the rst and second period are respectively
pc1 =
2 + 4   3S1
6 + 6
and pc2 =
4 + 2   3S1
6 + 6
:
It also holds that (S1; S2; ) belongs to Region Xncmh or X
nc
mh. In Region X
nc
mh, prices
are
pnc1 =
2 + 3   2S1
6 + 4
and pnc2 =
4 +    3S1
6 + 4
and in Region Xncmh, prices are
pnc1 =
2
3
  1
2
S1 and pnc2 =
1
3
:
In Region Xcmh it holds that (1  )=3 < S1  23 ; from which it follows that pc1  pnc1
and pc2  pnc2 :
The equilibrium outcome in the commitment case does not always coincide with
the equilibrium outcome in the non-commitment setting, in particular when there
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is one intermediate and one large rm. In these cases, it is the intermediate rm
that would deviate if the commitment equilibrium quantities were chosen in the
non-commitment setting. By transferring some of its quantity from the rst to the
second period, the intermediate rm could improve its prot, knowing that it forces
the bigger rm to adjust its second-period quantity downwards. This opportunity to
deviate protably leads to the non-existence of an equilibrium in Region XncØ :
In Regions Xncmh, X
nc
hm , X
nc
mh; and X
nc
hm, the protable deviation of the interme-
diate rm results in a change in the equilibrium outcome. Perhaps surprisingly, the
equilibrium outcomes change to the disadvantage of the intermediate rm. To avoid
a deviation by the intermediate rm, in the non-commitment case the large rm sets
a higher rst-period quantity than in the commitment case. This increase in sales
by the large rm is more than o¤set by lower rst-period sales by the intermediate
rm. The rst-period equilibrium price is higher in the non-commitment case than
in the commitment setting. The intermediate rm still sells all its production, lead-
ing to a strong increase in its second-period sales. The second-period equilibrium
price is lower in the non-commitment case than in the commitment setting. The
large rm reacts per-period optimal to the intermediate rms and has the same total
sales as before. It follows that the prot for the intermediate rm is lower in the
non-commitment setting than in the commitment setting, whilst it is the other way
around for the large rm.
Regarding consumer surplus, we mention the following. One may expect the
ability to commit to lead to less competition in the commitment setting than in the
case without commitment. However, this only holds for some settings in which future
prots are hardly discounted. The non-commitment setting gives the large rm more
opportunity to use its power, which, as a result, increases the rst period price and
decreases the second period price. Due to discounting, in most cases this results in
consumer surplus being lower in the non-commitment setting than in the case with
commitment.
Proposition 5.5 For every (S1; S2; ), such that (S1; S2; ) =2 XncØ and   2425 , con-
sumers prefer the commitment setting over the non-commitment setting. If  > 2425 ,
there are combinations of (S1; S2; ) for which consumers prefer the non-commitment
setting.
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that S2  S1. Whenever there is a
change in consumer surplus between the settings, (S1; S2; ) belongs to Region Xcmh;
and to Region Xncmh or X
nc
mh: Consumer surplus in Regions X
c
mh, X
nc
mh and X
nc
mh is
respectively
CScmh = (
4 + 2 + 3S1
6 + 6
)2 + (
3S1 + 2 + 4
6 + 6
)2;
CSncmh = (
4 +  + 2S1
6 + 4
)2 + (
3S1 + 2 + 3
6 + 4
)2;
CSncmh = (
1
2
S1 +
1
3
)2 +
4
9
:
For Region Xncmh and X
nc
mh, it holds respectively that
1
3(1   )  Si  23   19 and
2
3   19 < Si  23 . Now,
CScmh  CSncmh for Si 2 [
1
3
(1  ); 24  7   17
2
3
]
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and
CScmh  CSncmh for Si 2 [ 2 +
8
3
;
2
3
]:
It holds that
24  7   172
3
 2
3
  1
9

i¤   2425 and
 2 + 8
3
  2
3
  1
9

i¤   2425 . So for   2425 , consumers prefer the commitment setting over the non-
commitment setting.
The smaller rm prefers the commitment setting, the larger rm prefers the non-
commitment setting and consumers prefer in most situations the commitment setting.
Which setting then maximizes total surplus is the question yet to answer.
Proposition 5.6 Total surplus is higher in the commitment setting than in the non-
commitment setting.
Proof. We again assume w.l.o.g. that S2  S1. Whenever there is a change in
total surplus between the commitment and the non-commitment setting, (S1; S2; )
belongs to Region Xcmh; and to Region X
nc
mh or X
nc
mh: Total surplus in Regions X
c
mh,
Xncmh and X
nc
mh is respectively
TScmh = (
4 + 2 + 3S1
6 + 6
)(1-
1
2
(
4 + 2 + 3S1
6 + 6
))+(
3S1 + 2 + 4
6 + 6
)(1-
1
2
(
3S1 + 2 + 4
6 + 6
));
TSncmh = (
4 +  + 2S1
6 + 4
)(1-
1
2
(
4 +  + 2S1
6 + 4
))+(
3S1 + 2 + 3
6 + 4
)(1-
1
2
(
3S1 + 2 + 3
6 + 4
));
TSncmh = (
1
2
S1 +
1
3
)(1  1
2
(
1
2
S1 +
1
3
)) + (
2
3
)(1  1
3
):
For Region Xnchm and Region X
nc
hm, it holds respectively that
1
3(1  )  Si  23   19
and 23   19 < Si  23 . Now,
TSncmh  TScmh i¤ S1 2 [
 12 + 5 + 72
3
;
1
3
(1  )]
and
TSncmh  TScmh i¤ S1 2 [
2
3
; 2  4
3
]:
So, for S1 2 [13(1  ); 23 ], total surplus is the highest in the commitment setting.
Summary of comparative statics results for the commitment versus the non-commit-
ment case
The following can be said about the equilibrium outcome regions. There is no di¤er-
ence between the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment and the non-commitment
case if the rms are of equal size. Non-commitment is preferred over commitment
only by the larger of the two rms. When there is no commitment, the rst-period
equilibrium price is higher and the second-period equilibrium price is lower than in
the case with commitment. Consumer surplus is in most cases highest in the com-
mitment setting and total surplus is in all cases highest in the commitment setting.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that whether rms can or cannot commit to their sales strategy
inuences prices, sales quantities, prots and surplus. Comparative statics in the
case with commitment conform to standard intuition. In the non-commitment sit-
uation, however, a number of counterintuitive results were found. First, equilibria
may fail to exist. Moreover, in equilibrium prices may decrease over time and higher
stocks can lead to lower revenues from sales. Large rms benet from the absence of
commitment, contrary to small rms and, in most cases, consumers.
We have limited the analysis to the case where competition takes place during two
periods. We expect our main results to be true in the multi-period setting as well,
but we fail to have an analytically tractable model specication for that situation.
We have only analyzed the case where production has already taken place, and
rms compete in sales strategies. Such an assumption is valid if the capacity choice
is a long-run decision that is not altered easily, as is the case for instance in the
example of airplane companies mentioned in the introduction. An extension of the
model could be to make the production capacity choice of the rms endogenous, if,
again, the tractability issues can be overcome.
Another issue that should be addressed in future research is to what extent the
choice for quantity competition a¤ects our outcomes. It is natural to address the
questions of this paper for models of price competition. Also here, however, it is
not easy to nd a model specication that is su¢ ciently general but still analytically
tractable.
References
[1] Biglaiser, G. and Vettas, N., 2004, Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity
Constraints and Strategic Buyers, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4315.
[2] Edgeworth, F., 1925, The Pure Theory of Monopoly in Papers Relating to
Political Economy, vol.1 (London, Macmillan).
[3] Gabszewicz, J. and Poddar, S., 1997, Demand uctuations and capacity uti-
lization under duopoly, Economic Theory, 10, 131-146.
[4] Gaudet, G. and Van Long, N., 1994, On the E¤ects of the Distribution of
Initial Endowments in a Nonrenewable Resource Duopoly, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 18, 1189-1198.
[5] Hotelling, H., 1931, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 39, 1158-1167.
[6] Kreps, D. and Scheinkman, J., 1983, Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand
Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, The Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2),
326-337.
[7] Laye, J. and Laye, M, 2008, Uniqueness and characterization of capacity con-
strained Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Operations Research Letters, 36, 168-172.
[8] Levitan, R. and Shubik, M., 1972, Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,
International Economic Review, 13, 111-121.
23
[9] Lewis, T. and Schmalensee, R., 1980, On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenew-
able Natural Resources, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 475-491.
[10] Loury, G., 1986, A Theory of OilIgopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible
Resource Markets with Fixed Supplies, International Economic Review, 27,
285-301.
[11] Osborne, M. and Pitchik, C., 1986, Price Competition in a Capacity-Constraint
Duopoly, Journal of Economic Theory, 38, 238-260.
[12] Salo, S. and Tahvonen, O., 2001, Oligopoly Equilibria in Nonrenewable Re-
source Markets, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 671-702.
[13] Saloner, G., 1987, Cournot Duopoly with Two Production Periods, Journal of
Economic Theory, 42, 183-187.
24
Appendix A The Reduced Best Response Correspon-
dence
We derive the reduced best response correspondence of rm i for the non-commitment
case. To keep the appendix within reasonable length, we have omitted the derivation
of second-order conditions. In accordance with Proposition 4.1, we can restrict our
analysis to best responses against qj  12 . We distinguish three cases:
(A) qj < Sj   12 ;
(B) Sj   12  qj < Sj   13 ;
(C) Sj   13  qj  Sj .
These three cases correspond to the three cases of residual stock Tj = Sj   qj of
rm j with qualitatively di¤erent second-period behavior of rm j:
(A) qj < Sj   12
Using the reduced prot function (2), for 0  qi < Si   13 , prot is given by (Yhh),
and for Si   13  qi  Si, prot is given by (Ylh). Taking the unrestricted rst-order
condition of the prot function in (Yhh) and (Ylh) and solving for qi results in qhhi
and qlhi given by
qhhi =
1
2
  1
2
qj ;
qlhi =
1  qj   12 + Si
2 + 
:
It holds that qhhi 2 [0; Si   13) if and only if 56   12qj < Si. Similarly, it holds that
qlhi 2 [Si   13 ; Si] if and only if 12   12qj   14  Si  56   112   12qj . We therefore nd
that the reduced best response qi of player 1 to qj is given by
qi =
8>>><>>>:
Si; if 0  Si < 12   12qj   14;
1 qj  12 +Si
2+ ; if
1
2   12qj   14  Si  56   112   12qj ;
Si   13 ; if 56   112   12qj < Si  56   12qj ;
1
2   12qj ; if 56   12qj < Si:
(B) Sj   12  qj < Sj   13
It follows from the reduced prot function (2) that, for 0  qi < Si   13 , prot is
given by (Yhh), for Si   13  qi < 2Tj   1 + Si, prot is given by (Ylh), and for
2Tj   1 + Si  qi  Si, prot is given by (Yll). Taking the unrestricted rst-order
condition of the reduced prot function in (Yhh), (Ylh) and (Yll) and solving for qi
results in qhhi ; q
lh
i ; and q
ll
i given by
qhhi =
1
2
  1
2
qj ;
qlhi =
1  qj   12 + Si
2 + 
;
qlli =
1  qj + 2Si    + Tj
2 + 2
:
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It holds that qhhi 2 [0; Si   13) if and only if 56   12qj < Si. Similarly, it holds that
qlhi 2 [maxf0; Si   13g; 2Tj   1 + Si) if and only if Slhi < Si  Slhi ; where
Slhi =
3
2
+
1
4
   1
2
qj   (2 + )Tj ;
Slhi =
5
6
  1
12
   1
2
qj :
The requirement qlhi  0 is not binding, since qj  12 implies qlhi is positive. It holds
that qlli 2 [maxf0; 2Tj   1 + Sig; Si] if and only if maxfSllai ; Sllbi g  Si  Slli , where
Sllai =
1
2
(qj   1 +    Tj);
Sllbi =
1
2
(1     qj + Tj);
Slli =
3
2
+
1
2
   1
2
qj   (2 + 3
2
)Tj :
Since Sj   qj  1=3; it holds that maxf Slhi ; Slli g  5=6  qj=2: The intervals [Slhi ; Slhi ]
and [maxfSllai ; Sllbi g; Slli ] are overlapping. In particular, since qj  1=2; Tj = Sj qj 
1=2; and   1; it holds that maxfSllai ; Sllbi g  Slhi  Slli :
The reduced prot function of rm i has two local maxima if Slhi  Si 
minf Slli ; Slhi g. Since Slhi  Slli if and only if qj  Sj   8+724+18 , the prot function
has two local maxima if
Sj   1
2
 qj  Sj   8 + 7
24 + 18
and Slhi  Si  Slli
or
Sj   8 + 7
24 + 18
 qj  Sj   1
3
and Slhi  Si  Slhi :
To nd the global maximum, we compare the prots in both local maxima. The
prots corresponding to qlhi and q
ll
i are respectively
lhi =
4 + 4q2j   4 + 16Si + 8S2i + 2 + 8qj + 4qj   8Siqj
16 + 8
;
lli =
1-2+2-2qj+22qj+q2j+2q
2
j+
2q2j+8Si-4S
2
i +2Sj -2
2Sj -2qjSj -22qjSj -4SiSj+2S2j
4 + 4
:
It holds that lhi  lli if and only if Si  ~Si, where
~Si = 1  1
2
qj   (1 + 1
2
)Tj + (
1
2
  Tj)
r
(1 + )(1 +
1
2
):
Since ~Si > Slhi whenever qj  Sj   12 , qlhi maximizes prots for ~Si  Si  Slhi .
Since maxfSllai ; Sllbi g  ~Si  Slli , qlli maximizes prots for maxfSllai ; Sllbi g  Si 
~Si.
When maxf Slli (qj); Slhi (qj)g < Si  56   12qj we have a boundary solution, and
prot maximizing sales are given by qi = Si   13 .
One possibility remains: maxf Slhi ; ~Sig < Si  Slli . In this case, the prot
maximizing choice is either qlli or q

i : We argue that q
ll
i maximizes prots, so for
Slhi  Si  Slli ; the best response of rm i is qlli .
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It holds that
lli  i = (Si  
1
3
)(
4
3
  Si   qj) + 1
9

if and only if
Si 2 [5
6
  1
6
   1
2
qj +
1
2
Tj  1
3
q
(1 + )(3Tj   1)]:
Since
[ Slhi ;
Slli ]  [
5
6
  1
6
   1
2
qj +
1
2
Tj  1
3
q
(1 + )(3Tj   1)]
for
qj < Sj  
4 + 5   4
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
6
;
we have our desired conclusion.
Summarizing, the reduced best response qi of player i against qj for Sj   12 
qj < Sj   13 is given by
qi =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0; if 0  Si < Sllai ;
Si; if 0  Si < Sllbi ;
(1 qj+2Si +Tj)
2+2 ; if maxfSllai ; Sllbi g  Si  ~Si;
1 qj  12 +Si
2+ ; if
~Si  Si  Slhi ;
(1 qj+2Si +Tj)
2+2 ; if maxf ~Si; S
lh
i g < Si  Slli ;
Si   13 if maxfS
lh
i ; S
ll
i g < Si  56   12qj ;
1
2   12qj ; if 56   12qj < Si;
where
~Si = 1  1
2
qj   (1 + 1
2
)Tj + (
1
2
  Tj)
r
(1 + )(1 +
1
2
);
Slhi =
3
2
+
1
4
   1
2
qj   (2 + )Tj ;
Slhi =
5
6
  1
12
   1
2
qj ;
Sllai =
1
2
(qj   1 +    Tj);
Sllbi =
1
2
(1     qj + Tj);
Slli =
3
2
+
1
2
   1
2
qj   (2 + 3
2
)Tj :
(C) Sj   13  qj  Sj
It follows from the reduced prot function (2) that, for 0  qi < Si   12 + 12Tj , prot
is given by (Yhl), and for Si   12 + 12Tj  qi  Si, prot is given by (Yll). Taking the
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unrestricted rst-order condition of the prot function in (Yhl) and (Yll) and solving
for qi results in qhli and q
ll
i given by
qhli =
1
2
  1
2
qj ;
qlli =
1  qj + 2Si    + Tj
2 + 2
:
It holds that qhli 2 [0; Si  12+ 12Tj) if and only if 1  12Sj < Si. Similarly, it holds that
qlli 2 [Si  12 + 12Tj ; Si] if and only if maxf12(1    qj + Tj); 12 ( 1+ + qj   Tj)g 
Si  1   12Sj . We therefore nd that the reduced best response qi of player 1 to qj
is given by
qi =
8>>>><>>>>:
Si; if 0  Si < 12(1     qj + Tj);
0; if 0  Si < 12 ( 1 +  + qj   Tj);
1 qj+2Si +Tj
2+2 ; if maxf12(1     qj + Tj); 12 ( 1 +  + qj   Tj)g
 Si  1  12Sj ;
1
2   12qj ; if 1  12Sj < Si:
6.1 The reduced best response correspondence
Table 4 now follows immediately.
Appendix B Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We dene the sets Aj(1); : : : ; Aj(4); Bj(1); : : : ; Bj(7); Cj(1); : : : ; Cj(4) as the sets of
quantities qj satisfying the constraints as presented in Table 4. Notice that each of
these sets is a subset of [0; 1=2]: Moreover, we dene Aj(k1; : : : ; k`) = Aj(k1) [    [
Aj(k`); and similarly for sets Bj(k1; : : : ; k`) and Cj(k1; : : : ; k`): In the proofs we will
make use of Table 4. That table presents the reduced best response of rm i to a rst-
period sales quantity of rm j with the use of coe¢ cients 1; : : : ; 8: In the sequel we
will need the reduced best response of rm j to a rst-period sales quantity of rm i;
which follows from Table 4 by reversing the roles of rm i and j: The corresponding
coe¢ cients are denoted by 1; : : : ; 8:
Proposition B.1 If (qi ; q

j ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game and q

j 2
Aj(1; 2; 3) [Bj(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) [ Cj(1), then Si   qi  13 ; so qi 2 Ci(1; 2; 3; 4):
Proof. For qj 2 Aj(1; 3)[Bj(1; 6)[Cj(1) it follows immediately from Table 4 that
Si   qi  13 . For qj 2 Aj(2) [Bj(4);
Si   qi =
2Si   1 + qj + 12
2 + 

2
3 +
1
3
2 + 
=
1
3
;
where the inequality follows from qj  2: For qj 2 Bj(2);
Si   qi <
3
4
  1
4
  1
2
Sj <
1
3
;
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Aj (qj < Sj   12) qi ri
1) 0  qj < 1 Si 0
2) 1  qj  2 1 qj 
1
2
+Si
2+
2Si 1+qj+ 12 
2+
3) 2 < qj  3 Si   13 13
4) qj > 3 12   12qj 13
Bj (Sj   12  qj < Sj   13) qi ri
1) 0  qj < 4 Si 0
2) qj > 5 0 Si
3) maxf4; 6g  qj  5 1 qj+2Si +Tj2+2
2Si 1+qj+ Tj
2+2
4) qj  6; qj  2 1 qj 
1
2
+Si
2+
2Si 1+qj+ 12 
2+
5) 2 < qj < 6; qj  7 1 qj+2Si +Tj2+2
2Si 1+qj+ Tj
2+2
6) 2 < qj  3; qj < 7 Si   13 13
7) qj > 3 12   12qj 13
Cj ( qj  Sj   13) qi ri
1) 0  qj < 4 Si 0
2) qj > 5 0 Si
3) 4  qj  5; Si  8 1 qj+2Si +Tj2+2
2Si 1+qj+ Tj
2+2
4) Si > 8 12   12qj 12   12Sj + 12qj
Explanation of the symbols
1 1  12   2Si
2
5
3   16   2Si
3
5
3   2Si
4
1 +Sj 2Si
1+
5
1 +Sj+2Si
1+
6
2Si 2+2Sj+Sj (1 2Sj)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1++2
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
7
2Si 3 +4Sj+3Sj
3+3
8 1  12Sj
Table 4: Reduced best response correspondence Ri (qj) for 0  qj  12 .
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where the rst inequality follows from 5 < qj  12 and the second one from   1
and Sj > qj +
1
3  13 : For qj 2 Bj(3),
Si   qi =
2Si   1 + qj +    Tj
2(1 + )

(1 +  +
q
(1 + )(1 + 12))(1  2Tj)
2(1 + )

1 +  +
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
6(1 + )
 1
3
;
where the rst inequality follows from qj  6 (i.e. Si  Sci ), the second from
1
3 < Tj  12 and the third one from  2 (0; 1]. For qj 2 Bj(5);
Si   qi =
2Si   1 + qj +    Tj
2(1 + )
 1  2Tj  1
3
;
where the rst inequality follows from qj  7, i.e. Si  S
ll
i ; and the second one from
1
3 < Tj  12 .
Proposition B.2 If (qi ; q

j ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game and q

j 2
Aj(4) [Bj(7) [ Cj(4), then Si   qi > 13 ; so qi 2 Ai(1; 2; 3; 4) [Bi(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7).
Proof. If qj 2 Aj(4) [ Bj(7), then since qj > 3; we have Si > 56   12qj ; and
qi =
1
2   12qj . Therefore, Si   qi > 13 : If qj 2 Cj(4), then Sj   qj  13 ; Si > 1  12Sj ;
and qi =
1
2   12qj . This implies Si   qi > 13 .
We continue by solving for all Nash equilibria (qi ; q

j ) of the reduced game where
qj 2 Aj(1): Next we consider Nash equilibria (qi ; qj ) with qj 2 Aj(2): We restrict
attention to the case with qi =2 Ai(1); since using the symmetry of the rms such
equilibria follow already from the rst case. We continue with qj 2 Aj(3); and so on.
qj 2 Aj(1)
It holds that
qj < Sj  
1
2
; (3)
qj < 1 
1
2
   2Si; (4)
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = Si: (5)
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(1; 2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(1) : qj = Sj ;
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
1  Si + 2Sj   
2 + 2
; (6)
qi 2 Ci(4) : qj =
1
2
  1
2
Si: (7)
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If qi 2 Ci(2), then qi > 5 implies Sj < 12   12 + 12Si < 12 by (5) and Lemma 4.1,
so (3) leads to a contradiction.
Next, (3) and (6) imply Sj > 1   12Si, whereas qi 2 Ci(3) implies qi  8; so
Sj  1  12Si, a contradiction.
When qi 2 Ci(4); then qi  Si  13 and Sj > 8: These inequalities together with
the inequalities (3) and (4) lead to the conclusion that (qj ; q

i ) is a Nash equilibrium
with qj 2 Aj(1) if and only if qj = 12   12Si; qi = Si; Sj > 1  12Si; and Si < 13   13.
qj 2 Aj(2)
It holds that
qj < Sj  
1
2
; (8)
1  1
2
   2Si  qj 
5
3
  1
6
   2Si; (9)
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1  qj   12 + Si
2 + 
 1
2
:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4).4 This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qi =
1  12 + Si
2 + 
; qj = 0; (10)
qi 2 Ci(3) : qi =
1 + 2   2 + Si + 22Si   2Sj
3 + 5 + 22
; (11)
qj =
2  3   2 + 8Sj + 42Sj + 2Si
6 + 10 + 42
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qi =
1   + 2Si
3 + 2
; qj =
2 + 3   2Si
6 + 4
: (12)
Consider qi 2 Ci(2): Then qi > 5; so Sj <  2+3+
2 2Si
8+42
< 12 , and (8) leads to
a contradiction.
Consider qi 2 Ci(3): It holds that
5 + 2 + 2 + 2Si
6 + 2
< Sj  1  1
2
Si; (13)
where the rst inequality follows from (8) and (11), and the second inequality from
Sj  8: By rewriting the expression in (13), it follows that Si < 13   13:
However, this is contradicted by
Si  1 + 2   
2   2Sj
3 + 4
 1
3
  1
3
;
where the rst inequality follows from (9) and (11), and the second inequality from
Sj  8:
Consider qi 2 Ci(4). It is implied by (9) and (12) that
1
3
(1  )  Si  1
3
(2  1
3
):
4Note that, by Proposition B.1, qi =2 Ci(1). By Proposition B.1, if qi 2 Ci(1), then qj 2
Cj(1; 2; 3; 4).
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From (8) and (12) it follows that Sj > 5+5 2Si6+4 . In conclusion, (q

j ; q

i ) is a Nash
equilibrium with qj 2 Aj(2) if and only if qj = 2+3 2Si6+4 ; qi = 1 +2Si3+2 ; 13(1  ) 
Si  13(2  13); and Sj > 5+5 2Si6+4 .
qj 2 Aj(3)
It holds that
qj < Sj  
1
2
; (14)
5
3
  1
6
   2Si < qj 
5
3
  2Si; (15)
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = Si  
1
3
:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
4
3   23 + 2Sj   Si
2 + 2
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qj =
2
3
  1
2
Si:
Consider qi 2 Ci(2): Since qj = 0; the second inequality in (15) implies Si  56 :
We have that
1
2
< Sj <
Si   43 + 23
2
; (16)
where the rst inequality follows from (14) and the second from qi > 5: By rewriting
the expression (16), we nd that Si > 43 +
1
3; contradicting Si  5=6:
Consider qi 2 Ci(3): By (14), it should hold that
Sj > 1
1
6
+
1
6
   1
2
Si;
which contradicts with Sj  8.
Consider qi 2 Ci(4). It holds that
2
3
  1
9
 < Si  2
3
;
where both inequalities follow from (15). From (14), it follows that
Sj >
7
6
  1
2
Si:
The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, qj 2 Aj(3) if and only if
qi 2 Ci(4); Sj > 76   12Si and 23   19 < Si  23 .
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qj 2 Aj(4)
It holds that
qj < Sj  
1
2
; (17)
qj >
5
3
  2Si:
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1
2
  1
2
qj  1
2
:
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, qi 2 Ai(4) [ Bi(7).5 This gives the
following possibilities:
qi 2 Ai(4) : qi = qj =
1
3
;
qi 2 Bi(7) : qi = qj =
1
3
;
Consider qi 2 Ai(4) [Bi(7). It follows from (17) that
Sj >
5
6
:
For qi 2 Ai(4), it follows from qi < Si  12 that Si > 56 . Next, if qi 2 Bi(7), it follows
from
Si   1
2
 qi < Sj  
1
3
that
2
3
< Si  5
6
:
The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, qj 2 Aj(4) if and only if
qi 2 Ai(4) [Bi(7) and Sj > 56 ; Si > 23 .
qj 2 Bj(1)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (18)
qj <
1   + Sj   2Si
1 + 
: (19)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = Si 
1
2
:
5Note that Proposition B.1 excludes that qi 2 Ai(1; 2; 3) [Bi(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) and qj 2 Aj(4).
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By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
1  Si + 2Sj   
2 + 2
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qj =
1
2
  1
2
Si:
For qi 2 Ci(2), it can be found that
Sj <
1
2
(Si   1 + ) < 1
3
( 1 + )  0;
where the rst inequality follows from qi > 5, the second one from (19) and the last
one from   1.
For qi 2 Ci(3); (18) implies 56   16   12Si < Sj  1  12Si. By (19), Si < 13   13.
The other constraints are redundant.
Next, qi 2 Ci(4) implies Sj > 1   12Si, whereas (18) implies Sj  1   12Si, a
contradiction.
In conclusion, qj 2 Bj(1) if and only if qi 2 Ci(3) and 56   16   12Si < Sj 
1  12Si; Si < 13   13.
qj 2 Bj(2)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (20)
qj >
1   + Sj + 2Si
1 + 
: (21)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = 0:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
1 + 2Sj    + Si
2 + 2
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qj =
1
2
:
For qi 2 Ci(2), from qi > 5 it follows that Sj < 12 ( 1 +    Si)  0.
Consider qi 2 Ci(3). Inequality (20) implies Si < 13 ( 1 + )  0.
If qi 2 Ci(4), it holds again that
Si <
1
4
( 1 + 3   2Sj) < 1
3
( 1 + )  0;
where the rst inequality follows from (21) and the second one from Sj > 8.
In conclusion, qj =2 Bj(2):
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qj 2 Bj(3)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (22)
qj  maxf1-+Sj-2Si
1 + 
,
2Si-2+2Sj+Sj-(1-2Sj)
q
(1+)(1+12)
1 +  + 2
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
g; (23)
qj  1   + Sj + 2Si
1 + 
: (24)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1  qj + 2Si    + Sj   qj
2 + 2
:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qi =
1 + 2Si    + Sj
2 + 2
; qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qi =
1   + 3Si
3 + 3
; qj =
1   + 3Sj
3 + 3
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qi =
1  3 + 4Si + 2Sj
3 + 3
;
qj =
1 + 3   2Si   Sj
3 + 3
:
For qi 2 Ci(2), it follows from qi > 5 that Sj < 13 ( 1 + )  0.
If qi 2 Ci(3), it is implied by (23) that 13(1   )  Si  76   Sj   16 +q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1+ (
5
6+
1
6 Sj). It follows from (22) that Sj > 23 . The remaining constraints
are redundant.
Consider qi 2 Ci(4). By Sj > 8 and (23) it follows that 2   2Sj < Si 
7+10+32 6Sj 10Sj 42Sj+(5+9 6Sj 8Sj)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
6+8+22+4
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
. Such an Si only exists if Sj >
5+
6 . From (22) it follows that Si 
5+9 6Sj 8Sj
4 . Now, there only exists an Si such
that 2  2Sj < Si  5+9 6Sj 8Sj4 , if Sj < 5+6 ; a contradiction.
In conclusion, qj 2 Bj(3) if and only if qi 2 Ci(3) and 13(1  )  Si  76   Sj  
1
6 +
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1+ (
5
6 +
1
6   Sj); Sj > 23 .
qj 2 Bj(4)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (25)
qj <
2Si   2 + 2Sj + Sj   (1  2Sj)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
1 +  + 2
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
; (26)
qj  5
3
  1
6
   2Si: (27)
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We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1  qj   12 + Si
2 + 
:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qi =
1  12 + Si
2 + 
; qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qi =
1 + 2   2 + Si + 22Si   2Sj
3 + 5 + 22
;
qj =
2  3   2 + 8Sj + 42Sj + 2Si
6 + 10 + 42
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qi =
1   + 2Si
3 + 2
; qj =
2 + 3   2Si
6 + 4
:
For qi 2 Ci(2), qi > 5 and inequality (25) imply respectively that 13 < Sj <
 1+ 3
2
+ 1
2
2 Si
2(2+) . However, no such Sj exists, since this would imply that Si <
1
 ( 1+
1
6   162)  0.
Consider qi 2 Ci(3). It follows from (26) and qi < 5 that
7+912+2
2-12
3-6Sj-9Sj-32Sj+(5+2+2-6Sj-2Sj)
q
(1+)(1+12)
6 + 9 + 32   2
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
< Si  2  2Sj (28)
and from (25) and qi < 5 that
6Sj + 2Sj   5  2   2
2
 Si  2  2Sj : (29)
There exists an Si such that (28) if and only if Sj > 5+6 and there exists an Si
such that (29) holds if and only if Sj  5+6 , a contradiction.
If qi 2 Ci(4), inequality (27) implies Si  13(2   13). It follows from (26) and
(25) respectively that Sj >
7+6 1
2
+ 3
2
2 6Si 5Si 2Si+(5+5 2Si)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
6+7+22+(6+4)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
and Sj 
5+5 2Si
6+4 . The other constraints are redundant.
In conclusion, qj 2 Bj(4) if and only if qi 2 Ci(4) and Si  13(2   13);
7+6 1
2
+ 3
2
2 6Si 5Si 2Si+(5+5 2Si)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
6+7+22+(6+4)
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
< Sj  5+5 2Si6+4) :
qj 2 Bj(5)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (30)
5
3
  1
6
   2Si < qj <
2Si   2 + 2Sj + Sj   (1  2Sj)
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
1 +  + 2
q
(1 + )(1 + 12)
;(31)
qj  2Si   3   + 4Sj + 3Sj
3 + 3
: (32)
36
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1  qj + 2Si    + Sj   qj
2 + 2
:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qi =
1 + 2Si    + Sj
2 + 2
; qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qi =
1   + 3Si
3 + 3
; qj =
1   + 3Sj
3 + 3
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qi =
1  3 + 4Si + 2Sj
3 + 3
;
qj =
1 + 3   2Si   Sj
3 + 3
:
For qi 2 Ci(2), it follows from qi > 6 that Sj < 13 ( 1 + )  0.
For qi 2 Ci(3), it holds that Sj  1   12Si. It is implied by (31) that Si >
maxf4+5
1
2
  1
2
2 3Sj
6+6 ;
7
6   16  Sj +
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1+ (
5
6 +
1
6  Sj)g. From (30) it follows
that Sj > 23 . The other constraints are redundant.
If qi 2 Ci(4), it holds that Sj > 1  12Si. From (32) it follows that Sj  1  12Si,
a contradiction.
In conclusion, qj 2 Bj(5) if and only if qi 2 Ci(3) and Si > maxf
4+5 1
2
  1
2
2 3Sj
6+6 ;
7
6 
1
6   Sj +
q
(1+)(1+ 1
2
)
1+ (
5
6 +
1
6   Sj)g; 23 < Sj  1  12Si:
qj 2 Bj(6)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (33)
5
3
  1
6
   2Si < qj  5
3
  2Si; (34)
qj <
2Si   3   + 4Sj + 3Sj
3 + 3
: (35)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = Si  
1
3
:
By Proposition B.1, qi 2 Ci(2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0; (36)
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
4
3   23 + 2Sj   Si
2 + 2
;
qi 2 Ci(4) : qj =
2
3
  1
2
Si:
For qi 2 Ci(2). It holds that
Sj  1
2
(Si   4
3
+
2
3
)  1
2
( 1
2
+
2
3
)  1
3
;
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where the rst inequality follows from (36) and the second one from (34). This
contradicts with (33).
Consider qi 2 Ci(3):It holds that Sj  1   12Si. From (33) it follows that Sj >
1  12Si, a contradiction.
Next, if qi 2 Ci(4), it follows from (33) that Sj  76   12Si: By (34) and by (35) it
is implied respectively that 13(2  13) < Si  23 and Sj > 10+6 7Si 3Si8+6 . The other
constraints are redundant.
In conclusion, qj 2 Bj(6) if and only if qi 2 Ci(4) and 13(2   13) < Si 
2
3 ;
10+6 7Si 3Si
8+6 < Sj  76   12Si:
qj 2 Bj(7)
It holds that
Sj   1
2
 qj < Sj  
1
3
; (37)
qj >
5
3
  2Si:
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1
2
  1
2
qj  1
2
:
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, qi 2 Bi(7). This gives the following
possibilities:
qi 2 Bi(7) : qi = qj =
1
3
:
For qi 2 Bj(7), it follows from Si   12  qi < Sj   12 that 23 < Si  56 . From (37)
it follows that 23 < Sj  56 . The rest of the constraints is redundant.
Therefore, qj 2 Bj(7) if qi 2 Bi(7) and 23 < Si  56 ; 23 < Sj  56 .
qj 2 Cj(1)
It holds that
qj  Sj  
1
3
; (38)
qj <
1   + Sj   2Si
1 + 
: (39)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = Si 
1
2
:
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, qi 2 Ci(1; 2; 3). This gives the following
possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(1) : qj = Sj ;
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
1  Si + 2Sj   
2 + 2
:
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If qi 2 Ci(1), then, by qi < 4, it holds that Sj < 12   12   12Si. From (39), it
follows that Si < 12   12   12Sj .
Consider qi 2 Ci(2): It holds that
Sj <
1
2
(Si   1 + ) < 1
3
( 1 + )  0;
where the rst inequality follows from qi > 5 and the second one from (39).
For qi 2 Ci(3), it follows from qi  4 that Sj  12   12   12Si. By (39), it is
implied that Si < 13   13. From (38), it follows that Sj  56   16   12Si. The rest of
the constraints is redundant.
In conclusion, qj 2 Cj(1) if and only if qi 2 Ci(1) and Si < 12   12   12Sj ; Sj <
1
2   12   12Si or qi 2 Ci(3) and Si < 13   13; 12   12   12Si  Sj  56   16   12Si.
qj 2 Cj(2)
It holds that
qj  Sj  
1
3
;
qj >
1   + Sj + 2Si
1 + 
: (40)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) = 0:
By Proposition B.2, qi 2 Ci(2; 3). This gives the following possibilities:
qi 2 Ci(2) : qj = 0;
qi 2 Ci(3) : qj =
1 + 2Sj    + Si
2 + 2
:
For qi 2 Ci(2); it follows from (40) that Si < 12 ( 1 +    Sj)  0.
For qi 2 Ci(3), it is implied by (40) that Si < 13 ( 1 + )  0.
In conclusion, qj =2 Cj(2) if qi 2 Ci(2; 3).
qj 2 Cj(3)
It holds that
qj  Sj  
1
3
; (41)
1   + Sj   2Si
1 + 
 qj 
1   + Sj + 2Si
1 + 
; (42)
Si  1  1
2
Sj : (43)
We have
qi = 
R
i (q

j ) =
1  qj + 2Si    + Sj   qj
1 + 
:
By Proposition B.2, qi 2 Ci(3). This gives the following possibility:
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qi 2 Ci(3) : qi =
1   + 3Si
3 + 3
; qj =
1   + 3Sj
3 + 3
:
For qi 2 Ci(3), it follows from qi  Si   13 and (41) respectively that Si  23 and
Sj  23 .
Since qi 2 Ci(3) and by (41), Si  23 and Sj  23 . Next, it follows from qi  4
that Sj  13   13. By (42), Si  13   13. The remaining constraints are redundant.
In conclusion, qj 2 Cj(3) if qi 2 Ci(3) and 13(1  )  Si  23 ; 13(1  )  Sj  23 .
qj 2 Cj(4)
This case does not need to be calculated here, since, by proposition B.2, it can only
be combined with the situations Ai and Bi, and all these situations are already
calculated.
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